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This paper will brieﬂy present an argument regarding the transformation of the 
dominant orientation of Israeli Jewish society from relatively congruent collectivist-
statistism to an incongruent and unstable state of mind, which combines strong 
collectivistic tendencies on one hand and disillusionment with the state and the 
political system as a whole on the other, resulting in excessive individualism and 
political escapism. It will also make the argument that against the background of 
the severe challenges facing Israeli Jewish society, this prevailing state of mind is 
extremely dysfunctional. It may lead to far-reaching depolitization and „exit,“ to 
an extent that may reduce Israeli Jewish society‘s viability or – alternately – to the 
rise to power of a „strong“ leader, who, while he may deal effectively with the fears 
and realities of this progressing societal disintegration, but on the way, he may well 
take actions which will result in the erosion of Israel’s democratic nature.
The origins of Israeli collectivism
One of the most notable characteristics of Israeli Jewish society was its collectivist 
orientation. Much has been written about this highly mobilized society coping with 
the well-known consequences of long-standing national mobilization. These inclu-
ded pressures for far-reaching conformism, resentment toward individualism and 
neglect of societal realms, such as health, welfare and education, which, under the 
prolonged state of emergency and the ever-present security threat, were perceived 
by opinion leaders, politicians and the public as less critical to the maintenance 
of the national collective. Metaphorically then, the Israeli-Jewish individual was 
perceived and self-perceived as a single ﬁber woven into a large ethno-national 
fabric, which provides self-identity as well as spiritual and physical protection. 
The whole was viewed as far beyond the sum of its components, therefore indivi-
duals were expected to think not in terms of their own good but in terms of the 
collective interest. Individual success, or alternately, individual misfortune, were 
widely considered as being much less signiﬁcant than collective achievements or 
troubles – a kind of „one for all and all for one” cognition. Thus, for example, the 
grief of a bereaved Israeli parent whose son was killed during his military service, 
much as it was highly acknowledged and respected, was also „justiﬁed“ by the fact 
that the dead soldier scariﬁed his life for the noble cause of defending the nati-
on. At the same time, parents who did not act along the lines of „conventional“ 
mourning and challenged the policies or persons at the top who, in these parents‘ 
view, caused their personal loss, received much less sympathy and social support. 
On a different level, Israelis who left Israel with no „national” excuse, but in order 
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to make a better life for themselves outside the country, were widely denounced 
as „deserters“.1 
This collectivistic orientation, which strongly characterized Israeli Jewish so-
ciety up to the late 1970s and even afterwards in certain circles, deeply affected 
the societal operational mode. It had various ancient and more recent sources: to 
start with, Judaism has always encouraged the notion of a religious community 
with strong mutual responsibility. This responsibility is indicated by the Halachic 
pillar notion of „every Jewish person is responsible for the well being of his or her 
co-religionists“ (kol Yisrael arevim ze laze). This principle has many manifestations; 
for instance, according to Jewish orthodoxy, on most occasions prayers must be 
recited in the presence of at least ten men (minyan). Individual prayer is limited to 
times of day and occasions when having ten others around is unlikely. By the same 
line of religious reasoning, according to mainstream Judaism, sins committed by 
individuals or small groups are not only „their problem,“ because the punishment 
is often collective. Therefore, the responsibility for these individual sins and repen-
ting them rests on the shoulders of the entire community. This religious tradition 
of mutual responsibility was also expressed in the importance of giving to others 
within the community, as a religious command. In fact, Jewish traditional sources 
argued that charity (tzdaka) might save one from death. The relevant recipients, 
it should be mentioned here, are only Jewish, and not necessarily the most needy 
people around. In other words, from the religious vantage point, the relevant „col-
lective“ is well deﬁned and limited, not universal.
This religious collectivist orientation coincided well with the second source of 
the Israeli Jewish collectivistic orientation – the troublesome history of the Jewish 
people, which involved an incomparable amount of persecution, dislocation and 
hostility. Under such troubled circumstances, without the support of their own 
community and of Jewish communities elsewhere, the chances of individual Jews 
surviving in the Diaspora were often quite minimal. In fact, the manifest aim of a 
number of Jewish institutions, such as the Joint, was to cater to the urgent needs 
of Jewish communities and groups all over the world, based on the fundamental 
principle of a shared destiny. Lacking means of self-defense, Diaspora Jewish com-
munities could not physically protect their members; however, they could, through 
various means (often including extensive ﬁnancial transfers) lobby to get such pro-
1 The Hebrew term for someone who leaves Israel voluntarily to live elsewhere is „yored“ – someone 
who descends from a higher to a lower place, while someone who lives abroad in the service 
of an Israeli institution is referred to in Hebrew with a different term - „Shaliach“ (emissary).
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tection from local landlords or war lords, or from state authorities. Individual Jews 
who, for whatever reason, lived outside the community were much more exposed 
to physical harm and other kinds of persecution on the part of the hostile gentile 
society. Therefore, the mainstream preference was for living together. This corres-
pondence between religious principles and historical circumstances sustained the 
Jewish collectivistic foundation even in historical and social contexts where the 
protection of the community was less – or not at all – necessary, and even where 
individualism was the prevalent ethos. Thus, it is a well-known fact that in the last 
century, the hold of American Jewish congregations on their members has been 
signiﬁcantly stronger than that of other immigrant communities in the US. 
The third source of Israeli Jewish collectivism was the socialist ideology held by 
the stronger stream in the Zionist national revival movement of the late 19th and 
the early 20th centuries, and which perfectly ﬁt this traditional collectivist trait. 
Thus, although secular Zionists challenged orthodoxy and aspired to „normalize“ 
what in their view was an abnormal way of life of exilic Jewry, on the matter dis-
cussed here, the gap between old and new was fairly small. The expanded social-
responsibility notion fostered by socialist ideology went hand-in-hand with the 
Jewish perceptions described above – caring for the needy and the poor, sharing 
available resources and the principled undermining of individual material assets 
and achievements, certainly as proof of one‘s moral performance (in contrast, for 
example, to the Protestant ethic). Indeed, not all currents in modern Zionism em-
braced socialism; however, none of them advocated unmitigated capitalism or in-
dividualism. Even the non-socialists opted for much „softer“ versions of the free 
market ideology, and in all cases, emphasized, one way or another, the centrality 
of the communal aspect and the importance of collective responsibility. 
Collectivism was strengthened in Israeli-Jewish cognition by a fourth factor – 
the sobering realization that the regathering of the Jews in the land of their fore-
fathers in the context of the Zionist enterprise solved neither personal nor natio-
nal security problems (some would argue that the security problems facing Israelis 
is considerably greater today than those facing Jewish communities in any other 
country). It is a well-known fact that severe external threats, let alone involvement 
in protracted national conﬂicts, usually encourage collectivist thinking. Thus the 
clash between Zionist immigrants and the Arab population in pre-state Palesti-
ne, and, after 1948, the violent struggle between the state of Israel and her Arab 
neighbors, maintained and even strengthened the collectivist legacies described 
above. The ongoing Middle East conﬂict necessitated the continuing mobilization 
of Israeli Jewish society. The state of Israel, established by UN resolution in 1948 
with the termination of the British Mandate, and following a bloody war of inde-
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pendence, became, for most of its Jewish citizens2, both the epitome of the collec-
tive identity and the object of high hopes and aspirations. This, in its turn, inves-
ted the traditional collectivist orientation with a statist ﬂavor. The establishment 
of the state and the acute external threat further strengthened the dichotomous 
sense of „us“ as opposed to „them.“3 The, perhaps subjective, understanding that 
Israel had no one in the world to rely on added the aspect of self-reliance to the 
collectivistic-statist mélange.
For all these reasons, Israeli Jews viewed the idea of a strong state in a positi-
ve light. The state, which replaced the Diaspora community, was expected to cater 
simultaneously to a wide variety of needs of the individual and of the national 
collective. Security ﬁrst, and then policing, health, education, market regulation, 
construction of infrastructures, employment, environmental conservation, religious 
services, welfare, foreign relations and more, were all to be dealt with effectively 
and clean-handedly by the state and the leaders. Particularly in the state forma-
tion era, Israeli decision-makers were quite satisﬁed with the wide room for ma-
neuvering given them by the citizens and did their best to encourage the „strong 
state“ concept. Thus, statism (mamlachtiut in Hebrew – TH), was strongly fostered 
by the founders of the state of Israel, mainly by its ﬁrst Prime Minister, David Ben 
Gurion. In practice, this meant a large civil service and deep involvement of the 
state in almost every realm.
Statism and collectivism do not go hand in hand with individualism and priva-
tization. In fact, the latter were and still are negatively perceived by most Israelis 
as highly disintegrative and as encouraging internal inequality. In the eyes of the 
majority, the „private market“ is tantamount to a dangerous jungle, in which the 
average „man in the street“ has no chance of surviving. Thus, political parties and 
streams that adhered to liberal ideology remained, for many years, at the margins 
of political public discourse with low electoral potential, and the voice of free mar-
ket proponents was barely heard in the public sphere. 
This of course does not mean that at any point in time the Israeli state had 
full control of either the society or the economic market, as Israel has never been 
a fully socialist state or a people‘s republic a la Soviet Bloc countries. However, as 
mentioned, its involvement in many activities was signiﬁcantly greater and much 
2 Apart from the ultra-orthodox communities who religiously tabooed the secular Zionist state 
as a doomed-to-failure human effort to rush the coming of the Messiah.
3 This dichotomy has created a deep and, some would argue, unbridgeable gap between the 
Israeli Jewish public and the Israeli Arab one. This is because the „us“ or the „we“ of the Jewish 
majority, by deﬁnition, excluded the Arab minority, which was commonly perceived as part of 
the enemy collective – the Palestinians – and thus as a ﬁfth column.
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more acceptable than in most liberal Western states, which Israelis, and many peo-
ple from outside, tend to consider as Israel’s relevant reference group. 
The transformative era
Since the late 1970s and during the 1980s, several processes developed and con-
verged that limited the state‘s practical involvement in society and in the economic 
market, and also eroded the public‘s overall support for such involvement. Howe-
ver, this did not happen in a day or even in a year. First, in 1977, the social-demo-
cratic Labour party lost the elections to the Likud party, which entertained liberal 
ideas. Although the new party in power turned its back on socialist ideology, as its 
main electorate was the working and the lower middle classes, cutting down the 
state‘s resources for welfare, health and the like was politically impossible. Thus, 
for example, when the Israeli banking system practically collapsed in 1983 due to 
scandalous malpractice by the major banks‘ governors, the prevalent expectati-
on was that the state would step in, like a knight in shining armor, and save the 
public whose savings were deposited in these banks. Indeed, the state did come 
to the aid of the public by buying the banks‘ debts, thereby nationalizing ﬁve of 
them. And yet, by and large, the collectivist/statist modus operandi and cognition 
slowly eroded. Several sources of this decline, beyond the change in government, 
can be identiﬁed:
First, the 1980s witnessed the growing afﬂuence of Israel’s middle class. This, 
together with their greater exposure – through the media as well as longer and 
more frequent trips abroad – to the high standard of living and diversiﬁed services 
offered in liberal Western democracies, increased their dissatisfaction with the 
uniform and, in many respects, very basic services that the Israeli state provided. 
These services no longer appealed to signiﬁcant segments of Israeli society and 
no longer addressed their needs. Demands for better quality and more diversiﬁed, 
„tailor–made,“ services encouraged the development of private medical clinics,4 
privately-owned commercial media,5 and even private schools,6 and parental in-
4 Sometimes private care was given in public hospitals, a rather disturbing phenomenon that 
originated from the desire of private entrepreneurs at the time to compete with the public 
hospitals, not so much in terms of money but of expertise, because in Israel only public hospitals 
are university hospitals.
5 Previously, the media were mostly owned by either the state or party organs.
6 These schools were not called „private,“ but subject-oriented, in order to conceal the fact that 
they mainly served the better-off classes. It should also be noted that they always operated 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, which monitors all schools in Israel except 
for the education system of the ultra-orthodox sector.
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volvement in the curricula of state schools. In the ﬁrst stage, with the state still 
hoping to maintain its monopoly and with the statist orientation still prevailing, 
the authorities strongly opposed these new private or semi-private alternative 
service-providing systems. The authorities tried to shut them down completely or 
to limit their scope by direct and indirect means – from legislation to cooptation. 
However, life is stronger in such situations, and later the main strategy of the es-
tablishment was to ﬁnd ways to whitewash the alternative services, particularly 
as their existence „liberated“ the state from the need to respond to the growing 
demands of more „high maintenance“ social segments. Needless to say, the weaker 
social groups had less access to these alternative services and continued to make 
do with the state-provided, perhaps reasonably good but certainly less customer-
oriented, services.
Second, parallel to the improving economic situation of certain classes, the 
1980s also saw the expansion of lower income groups, mainly the ultra-orthodox 
and the Arabs. The number of poor Israelis increased even more following the vast 
waves of immigration to Israel in those years (in the early 1990s about one million 
immigrants – almost one ﬁfth of the overall Israeli population – came to Israel from 
the republics of the former Soviet Union).7 The state‘s ability to continue to provi-
de the level of services it had offered in the past lessened considerably and so did 
the quality of the services provided. The state welfare, health, education, policing 
and other service agencies became incapable of meeting the growing needs on a 
satisfactory level. Therefore, the authorities had no option but to acknowledge the 
existence of the private service-providing organizations. In fact, the state became 
quite willing to grant these agencies the right to provide services and even helped 
them ﬁnancially in some cases in order to somewhat reduce the pressure on its 
own institutions. The gap between the services purchased privately by the middle 
and upper-middle classes and the state services given to low-income public sectors 
widened drastically in these years and with it the support of the better-off sectors 
for free market ideas grew. The weaker sectors understandably cried out against 
what they considered the unraveling of the collective bonding and responsibilities. 
Yet their voice was barely heard and their political power was too small to stop 
the train from leaving the station.
7 In a way, this wave of immigration and the vast resources needed to cater to their needs led to 
the Israeli agreement to take part in the Madrid Conference of 1991, which in its turn opened 
the way for the Oslo peace process. This is because the American administration made it clear 
that it would not give Israel the necessary ﬁnancial guarantees to get the loans it supposedly 
needed in order to absorb this huge wave of immigration. Therefore Prime Minister Shamir, who 
basically opposed the Madrid idea, had no choice but to go there and take part in the process, 
although, as he said a year later, he was convinced that „the Arabs were the same Arabs and 
the sea [into which the Arabs wanted the Jews to go and drown – TH] was the same sea“.
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Third, globalization accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s and with it the Israeli 
high-tech and other internationally oriented industries. In fact, Israel turned into 
a high-tech seventh heaven – at certain points in time the number of Israeli high-
tech companies registered in NASDAQ was third only to American and Canadian 
ones. In order to expand their activities and increase their proﬁts, owners of these 
companies and other successful Israeli entrepreneurs needed less regulation and 
looser control by the state market economy. Thus, organized lobbies and individual 
industrialists put strong pressure on the government, and even more so on individual 
decision-makers, encouraging them to ease the various means of state control and 
regulation so that they could successfully compete in international markets.
Again, however, it should be emphasized that even in the heyday of the high-
tech industry, before the bubble burst in the early 2000s, privatization as an ideo-
logy was not openly professed. The few politicians, like Benjamin Netanyahu, who 
fostered it in words or deeds when in ofﬁce, faced severe criticism for allegedly 
turning their back on the noble ideals of equality and the Jewish tradition of support 
for the needy and the less well-to-do. As Minister of Finance in the early 2000s, 
Netanyahu endorsed a free market ideology. In spite of his objective economic 
achievements, he paid a very high price for this unpopular policy – in the eyes of 
many in Israel, it made him, for several years at least, „public enemy number one,“ 
or the epitome of economic brutality.
Fourth, with the growth in the number of young adults who had not been 
involved in traumas such as the holocaust and struggles such as the War of In-
dependence, and who were highly exposed to the youth culture of the West, the 
1980s and 1990s also saw a signiﬁcant growth in the legitimacy of individualism. 
It was no longer „not done“ to openly aspire to personal ﬁnancial success, to ex-
press non-conformist views, to opt for an individualistic style of life and expression, 
and even to seek one‘s fortune outside of the country, which in the past had been 
considered almost „desertion under ﬁre.“ The younger people often mocked the 
older generation’s nostalgia for the days when Israeli Jewish society was small and 
intimate, and when the idea of equality, even if never fully implemented, was che-
rished. Particularly in urban, secular sectors, though much less so in orthodox and 
certainly in ultra-orthodox circles, collectivism was considered very much passé.
Fifth, the hopes that prevailed in Israel in the early 1990s, with the signing of the 
Oslo Declaration of Principles (1993), for „a New Middle East,“ with free movement 
and open borders and the end of the occupation, also called for some relaxation of 
the tensions which had „justiﬁed,“ and even necessitated, a strong state and strong 
collective bonding. The New Middle East, foreseen by the architects of the Oslo 
process, mainly Shimon Peres but also, although to a lesser extent, Yitzhak Rabin, 
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was highly attractive to industrialists and the investor community, who expected 
it to lead to the opening of large Arab markets as well as those of countries like 
China that in the past had not been eager – or outright refused – to deal with Is-
rael because of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict and the occupation. Obviously, those 
who expected to beneﬁt from the opening of the borders between Israel and the 
neighboring Arab countries, almost exclusively from the upper-middle and upper 
classes, exerted all their inﬂuence on decision-makers to move in a free-market, 
minimum-state-intervention direction. However, those who feared that they would 
lose from such „high politics,“ for example, manual workers in development towns 
who suspected – quite rightly – that if peace agreements were signed, the factories 
in which they worked would be relocated to surrounding Arab states where labor 
costs were considerably lower, wanted the state to stay in the picture and in con-
trol. For these workers, peace was more costly than to other Israeli Jews – beyond 
giving up territories and other symbolic and material assets in return for an agree-
ment with the Palestinians, they were about to lose their jobs and perhaps even 
the state‘s protection if the industrialists had their way. It is not surprising, then, 
that together, the free market and peace came to be (negatively) identiﬁed by a 
number of Israelis with the class interests of the better-off societal sectors. 
The watershed
As described above, a fairly clear course of development could be observed in the 
transformative era: the collectivist/statist orientation of the Israeli Jewish popu-
lation slowly eroded, bringing Israeli Jewish society closer in this respect to other 
liberal Western societies in which individualism is respected and the state limits 
its involvement in the economy and in other societal functions. This clarity was 
shattered from 2000 onwards with the collapse of the peace process, the dramatic 
increase in regional and global violence, the bursting of the high-tech bubble and 
the subsequent economic crisis. The exposure of a series of corruption cases in 
which top politicians and civil servants were involved, or suspected of being in-
volved, was no less traumatic and shocking from the public‘s point of view than 
the regional crisis. These shocks brought in their wake conﬂicting cognitive and 
emotional developments that in combination have created a contradictory and 
admittedly hectic state of mind in the realm discussed here. On one hand, mainly 
under the growing security threat and the deteriorating economic situation, Isra-
eli society was pulled back to its collectivistic „state of nature“ with a reemerging 
demand for a strong state. On the other hand, the overload of stress, the painful 
disillusionment with the state‘s leaders and functioning encouraged societal dis-
integration and „exit,“ with a strong individualistic ﬂavor. 
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The collapse of the Oslo peace process in the year 2000 – causing the shatte-
ring of the new Middle East vision – and the outbreak of the second Palestinian 
intifada, with the sky-rocketing number of deadly terrorist attacks and the practi-
cal re-occupation of the Palestinian territories by the Israeli army, encouraged the 
„comeback“ of collectivism. The ﬂames of the „tribal ﬁre“ again pulled in many Is-
raelis who were attracted to it by the sharp decrease in personal security and the 
prevailing need for togetherness under a life-threatening external attack. It was no 
longer the Israeli-Palestinian pro-Oslo alliance against the Israeli and Palestinian 
anti-Oslo camps that mattered, but Israeli Jews against the Palestinians, and in 
certain respects, also against Israeli Arabs. Thus the deep cleavages created by the 
heated domestic controversy amongst Israeli Jews over the Oslo process and the 
price tag attached to it seem to have healed considerably with the reappearance 
of the „Palestinian enemy“ and the, at least temporary, moratorium on the issue 
of territorial concessions. 
The economic crisis caused by the halting of the peace talks and the increase 
of regional violence that made Israel much less appealing to external investors, 
accompanied by increased security-related state expenditures which brought in 
their wake successive budget cuts, mainly in the areas of welfare, health and edu-
cation, together with the bursting of the global high-tech bubble, caused severe 
deterioration in economic opportunities in Israel. This resulted in a parallel sharp 
increase in the number of those laid off work. And as the free market failed to meet 
the expectations of the public, eyes rested again on the state as the savior. The 
number of those requiring unemployment beneﬁts and welfare allowances from 
the government dramatically increased. Furthermore, the negative stigma attached 
in the past to those who lived on welfare vastly lessened because many of those 
who had no choice but to claim beneﬁts were now middle-class people – profes-
sionals and former high-tech workers, not the typical underachievers or „losers.“ 
Privatization was now identiﬁed by the mainstream as the cause of the trouble and 
many were now attracted to views demanding that the state make a ‚comeback’, 
and even take over areas that had been privatized in previous years. 
As mentioned, the reemerging security and economic needs for greater inter-
vention by the state were accompanied by growing empirical evidence, and hence 
awareness, that the authorities and decision-makers were incapable of dealing ef-
fectively and clean-handedly with their national missions. Thus, reality clashed with 
the expectation that the state would be able to deal with the needs. Furthermore, 
as mentioned, public discourse in Israel had not been welcoming over the years to 
liberal ideas and free-market ideologies. However, few voices pointed to the fact 
that perhaps the state could not deliver in the ﬁrst place and that it might make 
sense to look for solutions elsewhere – for example, on the communitarian level. 
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In fact, the state‘s difﬁculties in meeting the demands led to the emergence of an 
active and multi-faceted Third Sector. Thousands of NGOs were established and 
acted to respond to the needs of groups and individuals not sufﬁciently catered 
to by state agencies. The fact that the efﬁcacy of these NGOs was not necessarily 
much better than that of the state and that, in many cases, the services they pro-
vided were neither universal not ongoing was scarcely noticed by many.
What has indeed become very visible – and upsetting – to the Israeli public 
were the many cases of corruption, some of which matured into court cases and 
some that did not, that contributed to the deteriorating trust of the Israeli public 
in the political system. The ﬁnancial corruption allegations against former Prime 
Minister Barak and much more severe ones against Prime Minister Sharon and 
members of his family, against incumbent Prime Minister Olmert, and the sex ha-
rassment scandals in which President Katzav and former Minister of Justice Ramon 
are involved, are but a few examples of the sort of misconduct that made Israelis 
highly skeptical and cynical about politics and about the state. This in turn led to 
accelerating „exit“ – not necessarily in terms of emigration but in terms of people 
getting less and less involved in collective matters, as was clearly exempliﬁed by 
the unprecedentedly low turnout in the 2006 elections. The number of those who 
stopped reading the daily newspapers is another indication, particularly as Israel 
was always known for the high interest of its citizens in news and political mat-
ters. When the state and its leaders fail to meet public expectations, it is hardly 
surprising that people turn to „self-maintenance“ and far-reaching individualism 
as a means of survival. In other words, Israelis have not given up on their principle 
expectation for a strong state that will function as the collective caregiver, nor 
do most of them, certainly not the religiously observant, admire individualism per 
se. However, they act individualistically; some would even term it egotistically, in 
order to minimize their frustration and personal damage because of the inefﬁcacy 
of state agencies and accelerating social disintegration. And yet, although indivi-
dualism per se is not a problem for many libertarians and free market proponents, 
under the circumstances in which Israel operates, which call for a strong collec-
tive effort to meet the external threats, a low level of involvement by the state, 
the „exit“ of its citizens, and excessive individualism are quite risky, as they may 
well lead to social disintegration which may jeopardize the ability of the national 
collective to meet existential challenges. What may be acceptable, perhaps even 
welcome, to societies within the European-American „peace zone,“ is not necessa-
rily suitable in other parts of the world in which different rules of the game apply. 
The need to deal with existential threats may lead to an even more problematic 
development than individualistic escapism: the emergence of a powerful desire 
for a strong leader who may not be concerned with democratic procedures or va-
 Unfulﬁlled expectations: Israelis‘ changing view of the role of the state and its implications 13
lues. One case in point is the signiﬁcant electoral achievement of the right-wing 
Israel Betenu (Israel – Our home) party,8 led by Avigdor Lieberman. Lieberman, 
who calls for a transition from what he views as a weak parliamentary system to 
a strong presidential system, is not only an advocate of the swap program aimed 
at annexing the Arab populated areas to the Palestinian Authority (thereby strip-
ping them of their Israeli citizenship) in return for the annexation to Israel of the 
settlement blocs in the West Bank, but he also favors limiting the citizen rights, 
including free speech, of the Arab minority, widening the police authority in its 
struggle against organized crime, and a much tougher foreign and security policy. 
Lieberman’s rising popularity can be attributed largely to the prevailing desire for 
a „father ﬁgure“ who will bring the collective back together. Instead of an indivi-
dual struggle to survive, the leader, who is allowed very wide space for maneuver 
by his voters, even at the expense of certain democratic values and procedures, 
is expected to head a collective effort for national rehabilitation. Based on other 
countries’ past and present experience, the dangers of such a state of mind in ti-
mes of crisis cannot be overstated. 
8 The party participated in this format for the ﬁrst time in the 2006 elections, and won 11 of the 
120 seats in the Knesset (Israeli parliament).
14 Unfulﬁlled expectations: Israelis‘ changing view of the role of the state and its implications
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